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Abstract
The paper examines whether meeting performance targets in tests at school has
an effect on students’ subsequent achievement in education and the take-up by schools
of financial support from the government for students. We build a theoretical model
to describe the channels through which students’ belief of their ability, as proxied by
previous performance in tests, affect their current effort in preparing for a test, and
how previous performance affects the effort in teaching by a school. We find that an
increase in the performance target in the first test has an ambiguous effect on the effort
exerted for the second test. A higher performance target in the current test increases
the effort of low-ability students and teaching effort for low ability students, while it has
an ambiguous effect on high ability ones. Finally, an increase in government funding per
student increases the effort by students.
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1 Introduction
This paper investigates how performance targets in education affect students’ behaviour and
subsequent actions by schools. Performance targets are popular in several dimensions of an
individual’s life, such as education and the labour market. Targets are important in helping
individuals to build human capital or signal ability in education and at work. For example, a
student may not be motivated to study if she knew that performing above average at school
would not lead her to find a better job.
However, performance targets may have unintended consequences. For example, rewarding
individuals only if they perform above the average level may increase the average performance
in a school or a firm, although it may change individuals’ beliefs about their ability by over-
stating true ability for those meeting a target, and viceversa for those missing the target. In
addition, high ability individuals may exert little effort, as the payoff is not proportional to
one’s performance or effort. Potentially low motivation or performance may lead to an inter-
vention, for example, by parents and teachers to help students. Failing this, policy decisions
may help to rectify incentives and performance.
The effect of performance targets in employment contracts has been widely explored.1 Instead
little is known about performance targets as incentives for students, and also for schools. If a
student fails to meet an important target in test scores, this may decrease the motivation for
studying. Alternatively, the student may be more motivated to study than before, obtain a
high test score in the future, and perhaps choose to study a university degree. In addition, a
school may exert additional effort to help the students improving their performance in future
tests, and it may also obtain additional financial support by the government for each student
with special education needs in a school. Conversely, a school may pay little attention to
underperforming students, if this leads to no adverse consequences for the institution.
The recent increase in interest by policy-makers in the role of education in influencing students’
subsequent behaviour confirms the pressing need for additional knowledge of the impact of
performance target today on students’ future performance and choices in education, to inform
policy decisions.2 Hence, research on the impact of incentives for students on their future be-
haviour and choices is of interest to policy-makers who deal with education and public policies
for young individuals. The reason is that most policy research has focused on such determi-
nants of children’s education outcomes as parents’ education and income.3 In contrast, little
1See Prendergast (1999) for a review of incentives and performance targets in employer-employee contracts.
2In 2001 the Department for Education in the USA funded “No Child Left Behind ” (NCLB) (See “No
Child Left Behind”n http://www.ncpublicschools.org/nclb/). This is a multi-billion dollar policy initiative
to study the determinants of test score gaps among students of schooling age, and prevent adverse effects in
adulthood for those left behind at school. It helps to address such policy issues as low employment and wage
profiles over time, as well as health problems that lagging behind at school may lead to in adulthood. Since
2003 the Department for Education in the UK has funded ”Every child matters”, which is a similar policy
initiative to NCLB, but it puts additional emphasis on well-being and fostering positive behaviour in children
(see ”Every child matters” in http://www.everychildmatters.gov.uk.)
3Acemoglu and Pischke (2001) and Currie and Moretti (2003) offer evidence on the effect of parents’
socio-economic background on children’s education in the USA while Chevalier and Lanot (2002) offer similar
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is known about the effect of targets in education on future behaviour and choices by students
and teaching strategies by schools.
We build a theoretical model to describe the channels through which changes in the perfor-
mance target influence students’ behaviour and actions by schools. In the model, students do
not know their ability level.4 They obtain a belief about it by taking a pre-school test, and
then attend school. Before completing education, they decide whether or not to exert effort
in the final test. As per the school, it decides the teaching effort to exert for each student. We
study the equilibrium between students and schools and the resulting test score that interac-
tion among them leads to.
Our results show that an increase in the performance target in the first test has an ambiguous
effect on the effort that is exerted in the second test. In particular, it increases the effort in
the second test for the students who passed the first test, while it may decrease the effort in
the second test for those who failed the first one. Moreover, an increase in the performance
target in the second test increases the effort of low-ability students and the effort by schools to
teach low ability students, while it has an ambiguous effect on high ability students. Finally,
an increase in government funding per student increases the current effort by students. In the
analysis of test scores, our result show that an increase in government funding per student
increases the current test scores if the performance target is low and decreases it if the target
is high.
Bandiera et al. (2009) and Azmat and Iriberri (2009) show evidence of a positive effect of
disclosure of performance in tests at school on future performance, thus suggesting the policy-
relevance of gaining additional knowledge of performance targets in education. Sartarelli
(2011) offers a similar test for the behaviour of students, such as the probability of a police
warning, and the evidence shows negative effects on behaviour, although small and little sig-
nificant, of meeting performance target in test scores. Crawford and Vignoles (2010) show
evidence of a negative effect of government support programs in education on achievement
in the UK, while Figlio and Getzler (2002) show evidence of gaming by schools to obtain a
similar type support in the USA. In related research, Cullen and Reback (2006) show evidence
of actions by schools to game accountability systems in the USA.
The paper contributes to the literature on incentives for students and teachers in schools, e.g.
test-based accountability, by suggesting that the implementation of programs that promote
accountability may lead to effects that were unintended by a policy-maker at the design stage
of a policy. This suggests that a government faces a tradeoff in the design of education policies
between the richness of the outputs that an articulated policy may deliver, and the difficulties
in implementing such a policy, whose unintended outcomes may or may not be desirable.
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 outlines the model. Section 3
evidence in the UK.
4Gary-Bobo and Trannoy (2008) study the efficient university tuition fees where both universities and
students have a noisy signal of the students’ ability by assuming that students are not aware of their ability.
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describes the results and Section 4 concludes.
2 The model
Consider students in compulsory education in a country and normalise their number to one.
Students can have high (H) or low (L) ability, and they do not know their ability level. We
denote as λ ∈ [0, 1] the number of high-ability students.
Students take a test before starting school, they attend school and finally, before leaving
school, they take a second test, which are are to be thought as national tests5 Students may
either exert effort or shirk in any test, that has only two possible outcomes: the student may
pass (P ) or fail (F ). We denote the probability of passing one of the two tests as vij, where
i ∈ {H,L} indicates a student’s ability and j ∈ {1, 2} indicates whether a test is the first or
the second one that a student sits, according to the following mechanism:
vij =

1
(1− ηHj)
(1− ηLj)
0
if H exerts effort
if H shirks
if L exerts effort
if L shirks
If the student has high ability and exerts effort, she will pass with probability 1. If the student
has high ability but shirks, she will pass with probability (1− ηHj) , ηHj ∈ (0, 1), If the student
has low ability and exerts effort, she will pass with probability (1− ηLj) , ηLj ∈ (0, 1). Finally,
if the student has low ability and shirks, she will pass with probability zero.
We interpret ηHj and ηLj as measures of performance targets, increasing which makes passing
the test harder. The implicit assumption is that the performances either of a student with
high ability who exerts effort or with low-ability who does not exert effort are affected only
marginally by targets. This simplifies the analysis and allows us to focus on the group of
students’ population that is mostly affected by teaching strategies.
2.1 First test
We interpret the first test as one that assesses the proficiency, for example in English and
Maths, of a cohort of students starting school. The test score of the first test depends on (i)
the student’s ability, and (ii) her effort in preparing the test.
Exerting effort for the first test is denoted by ei ∈ [0, 1]. For the sake of simplicity, we take
both the score in the first test and the effort exerted in it as exogenous. The result of the first
test determines the belief that students have about their ability when they decide whether to
5An example of such tests are the “Scholastic Assessment Test” in United States and the “National
Curriculum Assessment” in United Kingdom. These tests are managed by the “Educational Testing Service”
(Rourke and F. (1991)).
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exert effort in the second test. This is denoted by pi (i | λ, ei, gz), where gz, z ∈ {P, F} is the
score in the first test.
Definition 1 A student’s beliefs about her own ability which are consistent with Bayes’ rule
are
pi (H | λ, gP , ei = 1) = λeHλeH+(1−λ)eL(1−ηL1) ,
pi (H | λ, gP , ei = 0) = 1,
pi (L | λ, gP , ei = 1) = (1−λ)eL(1−ηL1)λeH+(1−λ)eL(1−ηL1) ,
pi (L | λ, gP , ei = 0) = 0,
if the student passed the first test, and
pi (H | λ, gF , ei = 1) = 0,
pi (H | λ, gF , ei = 0) = λ(1−eH)ηH1λ(1−eH)ηH1+(1−λ)(1−eL) ,
pi (L | λ, gF , ei = 1) = 1,
pi (L | λ, gF , ei = 0) = (1−λ)(1−eL)λ(1−eH)ηH1+(1−λ)(1−eL) ,
if she did not pass it.
According to the test mechanism, a student who shirks and passes the first test has high ability
with probability one. Also, a student who exerts effort but does not pass it has low ability
with probability one. In those cases students know their own type after the first test. This
does not happen in the other two cases (exerting effort and passing/shirking and failing).
The game starts at this point. At the first stage, the school decides the amount of teaching
effort for each student. At the second stage, the student decides the amount of effort in order
to study for the second test.
2.2 Teaching effort
Once students took the first test, they start school, irrespective of the score that they obtained.
For simplicity we focus on a single school to assume away competition between schools. The
school decides whether or not to exert effort in teaching them, that is denoted by tiz ∈ [0, 1],
and it knows students’ scores in the first tests. The school also pays for each student it teaches
a cost q > 0, which we interpret as the monetary cost of hiring teachers, arranging cultural
trips and offering extra courses.
If a student passes the second test, the school obtains a benefit µ, because students’ attainment
increases their chances of pursuing further education or finding a job, and indirectly the
reputation by the school for the placement of its students. A school can increase its reputation
in different ways: it may derive more benefit from an increase in the job opportunities of its
most able pupils, or, vice versa, of the least able ones. To depict the interaction with students
in the most general way we abstract from these differences.
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If a student does not pass the second test, the school may ask the government for financial
support in order to increase the support for students in a later cohort.6 For each student
receiving the government support w, the student a lower benefit than if the student obtained
a high score in a test, w < µ. Hence the expected payoff by the school is denoted by
Π = Nµ+ (1−N)w − Tq,
where N ∈ [0, 1] denotes the amount of students passing the second test and T ∈ [0, 1] denotes
the number of students receiving teaching.
2.3 Second test
The score in the second test depends on (i) the student’s ability, (ii) her belief on her type,
(iii) her effort in preparing the test and (iv) the school’s teaching effort. The effort exerted
for the second test will depend on both ability and the score in the first test. We will denote
it as eiz ∈ [0, 1].
If the student passes the second test she obtains a benefit y > 0 with a probability given by
the teaching effort tiz, while exerting effort for the second test determines a utility cost c < y.
The fact that the effort into teaching influences directly the student’s benefit implies that, in
the hypothetical case where the student does not receive any teaching, exerting effort with no
help from school will lead to a negative expected payoff.
If the student fails the second test, her benefit is normalised to zero. Hence the student’s
expected payoff is given by:
S = pi (i | λ, ei, gz) eiz (vijtizy − c) .
3 Results
We study the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the game, which is a combination of school and
students’ strategies and beliefs such that both agents maximise their payoff. For simplicity, we
rule out pure strategies from the analysis. On the one hand, it is little realistic that a school
will deprive a student from teaching. On the other hand, scarcity in educational resources may
lead the school to devote a different level of effort to students with different characteristics. It
is also realistic to assume that that a student’s effort ei is strictly between the no effort level
at 0, and the maximum level at 1.
Proposition 1 There is a unique mixed-strategies equilibrium in the school-students game
6In the UK, English as Additional Language (EAL) or Special Educational Needs (SEN) programs offer
additional support at school to students who meet a number of eligibility criteria that are assessed by teach-
ers and psychologists. (DfE (2010)). Achievement in tests by a cohort of students is correlated with their
assignment to these programs, as well as to the assignment by subsequent cohorts (Sartarelli and Tampieri
(2011)).
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where the school strategy is:
tHP = tHN =
c
yηH2
,
tLP = tLN =
c
y (1− ηL2) ,
and the student’s strategy is:
eHP =
(1− ηH1 (1− eH)) (ηH2 − 1) (µ− w) + q
(1− ηH1 (1− eH)) ηH2 (µ− w) ,
eHN =
(1− eH) (1− ηH2) ηH1 (µ− w)− q
(eH − 1) ηH2ηH1 (µ− w) ,
eLP =
q
(1− ηL1) (1− ηL2) eL1 (µ− w) ,
eLN =
q
(1− ηL2) (µ− w) .
Proof. See Appendix
Note that the school teaching strategy changes according to the student’s ability but not
according to scores in the first test.
3.1 Analysis of equilibrium
We turn now to study the properties of the equilibrium, by examining how performance targets
influence the students’effort in equilibrium.
Corollary 1 (i)First-test performance target. As the first-test performance target in-
creases, eHP and eLP increases, eHN decreases and eLN is not affected.
(ii)Second-test performance target. If
ηH1 >
µ− w − q
(1− eH) (µ− w) ,
then the effort eHP increases as the second-test performance target increases. If
ηH1 <
q
(1− eH) (µ− w) ,
then the effort eHN increases as the second-test performance target increases. As the second-
test performance target increases, both eLP and eLN increases, tHP and tHN decrease while tLP
and tLN increase.
Proof. Differentiation of eHP with respect to ηH1 and ηH2 yields
∂
∂ηH1
eHP =
q (1− eH)
(1− (1− eH) ηH1)2 ηH2 (µ− w)
> 0
7
and
∂
∂ηH2
eHP =
(1− (1− eH) ηH1) (µ− w)− q
(1− (1− eH) ηH1)2 ηH2 (µ− w)
,
which is positive iif ηH1 > (µ− w − q) / (1− eH) (µ− w). Differentiation of eHN with respect
to ηH1 and ηH2 yields:
∂
∂ηH1
eHN = − q
(1− eH) η2H1ηH2 (µ− w)
< 0
and
∂
∂ηH2
eHN = −(1− eH) ηH1 (µ− w)− q
(1− eH) η2H1ηH2 (µ− w)
,
which is positive iif ηH1 < q/ (1− eH) (µ− w). Differentiation of eHN with respect to ηH1 and
ηH2 yields:
∂
∂ηH1
eHN = − q
(1− eH) η2H1ηH2 (µ− w)
< 0
and
∂
∂ηH2
eHN = −(1− eH) ηH1 (µ− w)− q
(1− eH) η2H1ηH2 (µ− w)
,
which is positive iif ηH1 < q/ (1− eH) (µ− w). Differentiation of eLP with respect to ηL1 and
ηL2 yields:
∂
∂ηL1
eLP =
q
eL (1− ηL1)2 (1− ηL2) (µ− w)
> 0
and
∂
∂ηL2
eLP =
q
eL (1− ηL1) (1− ηL2)2 (µ− w)
> 0.
Differentiating eLN with respect to ηL1 and ηL2 yields:
∂
∂ηL1
eLN =
q
(1− ηL2)2 (µ− w)
> 0
and
∂
∂ηL2
eLN = 0.
Corollary 1 shows that, given the same student’s ability, a change in the current performance
target influences the future students’ effort according to whether student passes the test today.
In addition, a change in the current performance target has a different effect on the current
effort level for students with a different score in the previous test. A higher current performance
target increases the current teaching effort by the school for low-ability students, as proxied
by the score in the first test, while it decreases the teaching effort for high-ability ones. We
then analyse how an increase in government funding may affect the students’ effort.
Corollary 2 An increase in government funding per student increases the current studying
effort.
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Proof. Differentiating eHP , eHN , eLP and eLN with respect to w yields
∂
∂w
eHP =
q
(1− ηH1 (1− eH)) ηH2 (µ− w)2
> 0,
∂
∂w
eHN =
q
(1− eH) ηH1ηH2 (µ− w)2
> 0,
∂
∂w
eLP =
q
eL (1− ηL1) (1− ηH2) (µ− w)2
> 0,
∂
∂w
eLN =
q
(1− ηH2) (µ− w)2
> 0.
3.2 Analysis of test scores
We now assess the effect of government funding programs on students’ test scores and whether
this differs by performance target thanks to the cross derivatives of test scores with respect to
performance targets ηH2, ηL2 and government financial support w. We define the test score as
the probability Prob(P ) = TSiz = eivijtiz that a student passes the test. Given Proposition
1, the corresponding tests scores are:
TSHP =
c
yηH2
(
((1− ηH1 (1− eH)) (ηH2 − 1) (µ− w) + q)(1− ηH2)
(1− ηH1 (1− eH)) ηH2 (µ− w) + ηH2),
TSHN =
c
yηH2
(
((1− eH) (1− ηH2) ηH1 (µ− w)− q)(1− ηH2)
(eH − 1) ηH2ηH1 (µ− w) + ηH2),
TSLP =
c
y (1− ηL2)(
qηL2
(1− ηL1) (1− ηL2) eL1 (µ− w)),
TSLN =
c
y (1− ηL2)(
qηL2
(1− ηL2) (µ− w)).
Proposition 2 shows how a change in government funding influences test scores.
Proposition 2 An increase in government funding per student increases the current test
scores for low performance target and decrease it for high performance targets.
Proof. Differentiating TSHP and TSHN with respect to ηH2 and w yields
∂2
∂ηH2∂w
TSHP = − cq
(1− (1− eH1)) η2H2 (µ− w)2 y
< 0,
∂2
∂ηH2∂w
TSHN = − cq
(1− eH1) η2H2 (µ− w)2 y
< 0,
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Differentiating TSLP and TSLN with respect to ηL2 and w yields
∂2
∂ηL2∂w
TSLP =
cq (1 + ηL2)
eL1 (1− ηL1) (1− ηL2)3 (µ− w)2 y
> 0,
∂2
∂ηL2∂w
TSLN =
cq (1 + ηL2)
(1− ηL2)3 (µ− w)2 y
> 0,
Differentiating TSHP and TSHN with respect to ηH1 and w yields:
∂2
∂ηH1∂w
TSHP =
cq(1− eH1)
(1− (1− eH1) ηH1)2 ηH2 (µ− w)2 y
> 0,
∂2
∂ηH1∂w
TSHN = − cq
(1− eH1) η2H1ηH2 (µ− w)2 y
< 0,
Differentiating TSLP and TSLN with respect to ηL1 and w yields
∂2
∂ηL1∂w
TSLP =
cqηL2
eL1 (1− ηL1)2 (1− ηL2)2 (µ− w)2 y
> 0,
∂2
∂ηL1∂w
TSLN = 0,
Proposition 2 shows a positive relationship between government financial support and test
scores.
4 Conclusion
We analysed whether meeting performance targets in education has an effect on students’ sub-
sequent achievement in compulsory education and the take-up by schools of financial support
from the government for students with certain characteristics. We built a theoretical model
to describe how students’ belief of their ability, that is proxied by by previous performance
in tests, affects their current effort to pass a test, and also how targets affect the effort that
schools put in teaching. An increase in the performance target in the first test has an am-
biguous effect on the effort by students in the second test. An increase in the performance
target in the current test increases the effort of low-ability students and teaching effort for low
ability students, while it has an ambiguous effect on high ability ones. Finally, an increase in
government funding per student increases the current effort by students.
In the design of education policies a government sets among other rules those over the content
and the marking of tests for students in schools, and the disclosure of test scores to students
and their parents. It may also wish to encompass incentives for schools and devices that help
policy-makers to learn whether and why students in certain schools obtain higher scores than
students in other schools, such as performance targets in tests. Hence, a government may face
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a tradeoff. A simple policy that only focuses on the administration of tests is easy to imple-
ment but it may not be helpful to help policy-makers learning more about schools with high
or low performances. Viceversa, a policy that also sets incentives for schools and summarises
the performance by schools may appear to deliver more than a simple policy, but it may also
be difficult to implement.
Promoting incentives in schools, e.g. test-based accountability, may lead to effects that were
unintended by a policy-maker at the design stage of a policy. In education policies performance
targets were designed to influence school choice by students and the allocation of funding to
schools by the government. The paper shows that changes in such targets also modify the
incentives by teachers, who may devote more effort on students with certain characteristics
than on others. Future research assessing the effect of targets in the delivery of services other
than education, such as health or social services, may offer useful evidence for policy-makers’
decisions on contracts and the allocation of resources for teachers, as well as for employees in
other areas in the public sector.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
We solve the mixed strategy by backward induction, we thus start from the second stage where
students decide their effort in order to take the second test.
Students. If the student exerted effort and passed the first test, her expected payoff is:
S (ei = 1, eiH = 1) =
λeH (ytHP − c) + (1− λ) eL (1− ηL1) (ytLP (1− ηL2)− c)
λeH + (1− λ) eL (1− ηL1) ,
if the student exerts effort for the second test and:
S (ei = 1, eiH = 0) =
λeHytHP (1− ηH2)
λeH + (1− λ) eL (1− ηL1) ,
if she shirks. The indifference condition is given by:
S (ei = 1, eij = 1) = (ei = 1, eij = 0) . (1)
If the student shirked and failed the first test, her expected payoff is:
S (ei = 1, eiN = 0) =
λ (1− eH) ηH1 (ytHP − c) + (1− λ) (1− eL) (ytLP (1− ηL2)− c)
λ (1− eH) ηH1 + (1− λ) (1− eL) ,
if the student exerts effort and:
S (eHP = 0) =
λ (1− eH) ηH1ytHP (1− ηH2)
λ (1− eH) ηH1 + (1− λ) (1− eL) ,
if she shirks. The indifference condition is given by:
S (ei = 1, eiN = 1) = S (ei = 1, eiN = 0) . (2)
If the student shirked and passed the first test, she knows that she has high ability. Her
expected payoff is:
S (eH = 1, eHP = 1) = ytHP − c,
if the student exerts effort and:
S (eH = 1, eHP = 0) = ytHP (1− ηH2) ,
if she shirks. The indifference condition is given by:
S (eH = 1, eHP = 1) = S (eH = 1, eHP = 0) . (3)
If the student exerted effort and failed the first test, she knows that she has low ability.
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Her expected payoff is:
S (eL = 1, eLF = 1) = (1− ηL2) ytHP − c,
if the student exerts effort and:
S (eH = 1, eHP = 0) = ytHP (1− ηH2) ,
if she shirks. The indifference condition is given by:
S (eH = 1, eHP = 1) = S (eH = 1, eHP = 0) . (4)
Solving (1), (2), (3) and (4) by tHP , tHL, tLP and tLN we obtain the strategy depicted in
Proposition 1.
School. To begin with, note that, in the case that school does not give any teaching to
a student, her expected payoff of exerting effort is always negative, since the cost of studying
without any support from the school is too high and as a consequence shirking is a strictly
dominant strategy fort the student. It follows that the school obtains full government funding
for a student in the case of no teaching at all.
If the student has high ability and passed the first test, the school expected payoff Π (tHP = 1)
is
λ (eH + (1− eH) (1− ηH1)) (((eHP + (1− eHP ) (1− ηH2))µ+ (1− eHP ) ηH2w)− q) ,
if it exerts teaching effort and
Π (tHP = 0) = λ (eH + (1− eH) (1− ηH1))w,
if it does not. The indifference condition is given by:
Π (tHP = 1) = Π (tHP = 0) .
Solving by eHP , we obtain the result depicted in Proposition 1.
If the student has high ability and failed the first test, the school expected payoff Π (tHN = 1)
is
λ ((1− eH) ηH1) (((eHN + (1− eHN) (1− ηH2))µ+ (1− eN) ηH2w)− q) ,
if it exerts teaching effort and
Π (tHN = 0) = λ ((1− eH) ηH1)w,
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if it does not. The indifference condition is given by:
Π (tHN = 1) = Π (tHN = 0) .
Solving by eHN , we obtain the result depicted in Proposition 1.
If the student has low ability and passed the first test, the school expected payoff Π (tLP = 1)
is
(1− λ) (eL (1− ηL1)) (((eLP (1− ηL2))µ+ (eLPηL2 + (1− eLP ))w)− q) ,
if it exerts teaching effort and
Π (tLP = 0) = (1− λ) (eL (1− ηL1))w,
if it does not. The indifference condition is given by:
Π (tLP = 1) = Π (tLP = 0) .
Solving by eLP , we obtain the result depicted in Proposition 1.
If the student has low ability and failed the first test, the school expected payoff Π (tLN = 1)
is
(1− λ) (eLηL1 + (1− eL)) (((eLN (1− ηL2))µ+ (eLNηL2 + (1− eLN))w)− q) ,
if it exerts teaching effort and
Π (tLN = 0) = (1− λ) (eLηL1 + (1− eL))w,
if it does not. The indifference condition is given by:
Π (tLN = 1) = Π (tLN = 0) .
Solving by eLN , we obtain the result depicted in Proposition 1.
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